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THE IMPORTANCE AND OVERUSE
OF POLICY AND CUSTOM CLAIMS:
A VIEW FROM ONE TRENCH
The Honorable David F. Hamilton*

INTRODUCTION

My role in this Symposium is not as a scholar but more, I suppose,
as a laboratory specimen for examination. I hope to learn at least as
much as I teach in this Symposium. As a specimen for examination, I
recognize that what I contribute may not be what I intend to contribute. My viewpoint is from one of the front lines of civil rights litigation, one United States District Court, in the midst of a shifting
kaleidoscope of civil rights issues.
Our focus in this Symposium is on Monell cases-those plaintiffs
alleging under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 that the policies or customs of local
governments have caused violations of their federal rights. 2 From my
vantage point in a district court, I offer some observations on three
aspects of Monell litigation. First, I suggest that, despite the importance of Monell claims, litigants and courts spend excessive time on
these claims, primarily because a plaintiff with a viable claim against
individual officers or other government employees should ordinarily
be able to recover damages without having to prove a Monell claim
against a local government. As a result, in my view, Monell claims
should be litigated and tried less often. When serious Monell claims
are litigated, however, they may take on substantial importance. Second, I will address some of the practical problems highlighted by the
Supreme Court's decision in McMillian v. Monroe County3 concerning
which governmental entities are subject to Monell liability and which
are exempt from § 1983 liability as arms of the state government. Fi* David F. Hamilton was appointed United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Indiana by President Clinton in 1994. Judge Hamilton was formerly a partner at Barnes &
Thornburg, a private law firm in Indianapolis. He served as Counsel to the Governor of Indiana
from 1989-91. He was involved in civil rights cases both as Counsel to the Governor and as a
volunteer lawyer for the Indiana Civil Liberties Union. Judge Hamilton graduated from
Haverford College and Yale Law School, and served as law clerk to Judge Richard D. Cudahy
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
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nally, I will address remedies for conflict of interest issues that can
arise in Monell cases when one lawyer or law firm represents both the
individual defendants on individual claims and the local government
defendant on Moneil claims. Before turning to these specific issues,
however, I address some background matters on the volume and importance of these cases.
I.

BACKGROUND

The flow of Monell policy and custom cases is substantial. Apart
from prisoner petitions, the statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show that during fiscal year 1997, in
the category of private civil rights cases described as "other," meaning
other than employment, voting, housing, and welfare matters, 18,396
were filed in the federal district courts. 4 This is the category that
would include, for example, claims of excessive force or unlawful
arrest, or unlawful search or seizure. These are cases in which Monell
policy and custom claims are often presented. That number is about
6.7% of all civil filings in the district courts.5 In addition to these
cases, we must also consider the 28,635 claims filed by prisoners in
state, local, and federal custody during the same period alleging civil
rights violations, aimed primarily at conditions of confinement. 6
Those petitions amount to more than 10% of all civil filings on a national basis. 7 These statistical categories are not perfectly matched up
with the Monell custom and policy cases that are the subject of this
Symposium. For example, Monell claims are often asserted in employment cases against local governments that are excluded from this
reporting category, and not all police, jail, and prison cases include
Monell claims. Nevertheless, these figures provide a reasonable baseline for estimating at least the relevant order of magnitude. When we
4.

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
1997 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 129.

UNITED STATES COURTS,

5. Id. at 128-29. This percentage was reached by taking the total number of cases listed as
"Other Civil Rights" (18,396) in 1997 and dividing it by the total number of all civil cases commenced in 1997, listed as "Total Cases" (272,027).
6. Id. at 129-30.
7. The number of civil rights cases filed by prisoners in 1997 represents a dramatic drop from
levels in prior years. The comparable number in 1995 was 41,679, representing 16.8% of all civil
filings, and in 1996 was 41,215, representing 15.3% of all civil filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1996
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 135-37. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 took effect April
26, 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996). One principal purpose of that statute was to reduce the volume of such litigation, especially frivolous claims. H.R. Rep. No. 10421, at 7-8 (1995). The drop in prisoners' filings suggests that the new legislation is having the
intended overall effect.
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talk about Monell custom and policy claims and legal doctrines, we are
talking about subjects of great practical importance in the daily and
8
weekly work of district courts all over the country.
My view is from a trench, not from a high vantage point that lets me
examine the whole landscape of civil rights litigation and enforcement. In managing and resolving this volume of cases, the district
courts decide a high volume of summary judgment motions and Rule
12(b)(6) motions, 9 especially when dealing with Monell policy and
custom claims. Few of these cases will reach a trial without first surviving a dispositive motion. We are busy trying or settling those cases
that are not resolved on motions. Relatively few of the large number
of these cases present the cutting-edge legal issues that may be of
greatest interest to the scholars in this Symposium, who are looking at
solutions to legal problems I do not yet even see on my horizon. In
my experience, the substantial majority of cases require application of
relatively well-established legal doctrines to the specific facts developed in the record. The most common issue is simply whether the
plaintiff has enough evidence that the local government's agents have
committed similar wrongs against a sufficient number of others to permit a finding of a municipal custom or policy. 10
My initial emphasis on the volume of Monell cases should not distract any of us from the importance of these cases, both individually
and collectively. In private civil rights cases, especially those involving
actions of law enforcement officers or prison officials, the federal
courts are constantly patrolling the boundaries between liberty and
order, the boundaries between the rights of individual citizens to be
left alone or to be treated decently by governments, and the ability of
society to protect itself from crime and other antisocial conduct.
Where there is a serious claim that government officers and employees have violated a person's constitutional rights as a matter of government policy or custom, the claim may have added importance for
members of the public who are not before the court as parties.
Among the responsibilities assigned to the federal district courts, none
are more important in preserving our freedom than finding the appro8. For example, a Westlaw search conducted on September 7, 1998, of the ALLFEDS
database for references to "Monell" within the same paragraph as "policy" or "custom" turned
up 459 opinions in calendar year 1997. At the district court level, of course, the vast majority of
decisions are not published or reported on national electronic databases.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
10. See generally Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (holding that proof of a
single incident of unconstitutional activity by local government employees is generally not sufficient to prove a custom or practice).
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priate balance between the demands of liberty and the need for order
in these cases.
Despite the high stakes for society in these civil rights cases, it is
easy for judges and lawyers to get caught up in the mental gymnastics
required to apply the complex "system"-and I use the term loosely,
without intending to imply a high degree of rationality or coherenceof legal doctrines that govern private efforts to obtain relief for alleged violations of civil rights. The role of the district court judge, of
course, is to deal with the law as a given. It is not my role in court
opinions or in this paper to try to explain or rationalize why, for example, local governments can be sued for damages under Monell while
state governments cannot be sued for damages under Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police,1 let alone to explain why that situation
makes any practical sense in balancing the rights of citizens against the
powers of government. Those are simply given features of the legal
12
landscape in which I operate.
11. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
12. A recent Seventh Circuit decision provides a good example of how tangled the doctrines
governing civil rights cases have become. In David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998),
the Cook County Public Guardian had filed suit in 1979 in federal court on behalf of a class of
delinquent children with emotional or mental problems. Id. at 781. The suit sought to require
Illinois state officials to provide to the class members the same social and educational services
the state provided to emotionally or mentally handicapped children who were not delinquent.
Id. at 781-82. When the case began, the defendants were the directors of state agencies that
could provide the services, and the basis for the federal claim was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Id. at 783. The parties agreed to a consent decree in 1981 to provide the
services plaintiffs sought. Id. at 782. In 1995, however, the state legislature enacted legislation
limiting the authority of the state Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide services to delinquent children over age 13. Id. The DCFS then sought relief from the
consent decree because the new state legislation imposed obligations that potentially conflicted
with its obligations under the consent decree. Id. at 783-84. The district court denied relief.
David B. v. Patla, 950 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The Seventh Circuit held in 1997 that the
Rehabilitation Act did not support federal subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded the case to
determine whether a substantial federal claim was present to support federal subject matter
jurisdiction. David B. v. McDonald, 116 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997).
After the district court found on remand that it still had jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on the Eleventh Amendment. David B., 156 F.3d at 783-84. Because the plaintiff
class sought injunctive relief, the defendants were state officials named in their official capacities.
Id. at 783. That is the standard technique, relying on the legal fiction that a state official violating federal law is acting outside his or her official powers, for avoiding Eleventh Amendment
problems in cases seeking injunctive relief. See ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). After the
1997 remand, the plaintiffs had to abandon their claim under the Rehabilitation Act and shifted
their theory to the Due Process Clause, arguing that the custodians of the plaintiff class had a
duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide the services the class sought. David B., 156
F.3d at 782-83. In its 1998 decision, however, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs had not
named the correct state officials in their individual capacities to support a due process claim. Id.
at 783. The problem was that the officials with the federal duty to class members under the
Fourteenth Amendment were the plaintiffs' custodians, not the directors of the social service
agencies. Id. at 783-84. The Seventh Circuit added that plaintiffs could not sue the juvenile
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The view from this trench is not a perspective that encourages reflection. It may be worth mentioning some institutional biases-or
perhaps "predispositions" would be a better word. First, my predisposition is to try a case once and only once, if I can help it. Also, my
predisposition is to spend my time, and to encourage lawyers and parties to spend their time and energy available in litigation, on core
questions of liability and damages-that is, on the issues that go to the
merits of a claim-while trying to minimize the time and energy spent
on collateral matters. As a result, I have a predisposition to prefer
that threshold and collateral issues like statutes of limitations and
identifying the correct defendants be resolved by relatively bright-line
legal rules that lawyers, litigants, and judges can understand readily
and apply quickly.
Another important feature of private civil rights litigation is the
wide variation in lawyers' familiarity with the complex network of
legal doctrines that govern these cases. In my court there are a
number of experienced and skilled lawyers who make their livings
representing plaintiffs or local governments and their officials. These
lawyers know the civil rights field thoroughly. But many private civil
rights cases are brought or defended by lawyers who, regardless of the
expertise they may have in other fields, simply have not done enough
civil rights work to know even the most important doctrines and the
best solutions to common problems for both plaintiffs and defendants.
Also, of course, a number of private civil rights cases are filed pro se
by litigants who often are mystified by the complexities of such basic
matters as deciding which defendants should be sued in what capacity
for what kind of relief.
With this wide range of expertise and experience in confronting the
often complicated legal doctrines and potential procedural pitfalls, it
is easy for a private civil rights case to be ensnared quickly in motions
practice, especially 12(b)(6) motions challenging the plaintiff's pleadings. 13 These motions are usually a slow and expensive way to deal
with problems such as whether the plaintiff has identified the right
court or its judges to enforce their due process claims, but would have to raise their due process
claims in proceedings before that court. Id. Because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the plaintiffs could not pursue those claims in a federal district court but would have to appeal through
the state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 784 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983)). Accordingly, the 1979 case was remanded in 1998 with instructions to vacate the
consent decree and to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and with an invitation to
plaintiffs to try to sue some other defendants in federal court, or to file a new lawsuit in state
court. Id.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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defendants or can, if she proves her case, obtain the relief she really
seeks. Many of these pleading errors can be and should be corrected
once they are identified by a defendant's motion and/or a judge's decision. As a result, these motions rarely resolve a case.
One simple and effective technique for minimizing the time and expenses drained by poor pleading on either side is for the district judge
or magistrate judge to use an initial pretrial conference to identify the
problems and to give the party with the problem (most often the
plaintiff) an opportunity to replead quickly. Handling such matters
with a quick oral explanation of the governing legal doctrine can prevent opposing counsel and the court from spending a lot of time writing the briefs or the opinions explaining problems that can often be
resolved in a few minutes. Almost by definition, of course, that approach is rarely needed when counsel on both sides know the field,
but too often one or both sides do not. The court can then use its
power to manage a case so as to avoid elementary motions practice
that is both useless and, I must add from the judge's point of view,
boring. It is better to explain the basics orally and early, and to tell
the parties which problems need to be fixed quickly.
II.

Too

MUCH TIME AND ENERGY IS SPENT ON MONELL POLICY
AND CUSTOM CLAIMS:

The Reasons for Bringing a Monell Claim
We are not dealing here with a rationally designed system of legal
doctrines. We are dealing with a web of legal doctrines that are complex and, for many lawyers and litigants, and not a few judges, confusing. This web of legal doctrines has grown incrementally since the
Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape14 essentially rediscovered § 1983
after nearly a century of disuse. The growth has been more like the
slow growth of a coral reef than the construction of a piece of machinery designed by rational experts to accomplish a well-defined purpose.
This process is evident from the Justices' opinions in Monell itself.
Monell presented a challenge to an explicit governmental policy-a
policy that required pregnant government employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before such leaves were medically required. 15 That
original core of Monell remains important and viable. One reason it
remains important is that in cases challenging explicit government policies on constitutional grounds, the prospects of individual liability
usually are not promising (because of the qualified immunity de14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
15. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978).
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fense). From my perspective, though, a good deal of the unnecessary
Monell litigation stems from the invitation in Monell, based on the
"custom or usage" language in § 1983 itself, to treat some "customs"
or widespread practices as the equivalent of explicit government policies. My point here is not to criticize that element of Monell. From
the perspective of a victim of governmental abuse, it would make little
sense to draw a bright legal line between an explicit unconstitutional
policy and a widespread practice or custom of violating constitutional
rights. My point, however, is that in a substantial proportion of the
cases asserting Monell claims based on alleged practices or customs,
the Monell claims should have little practical significance.
From the plaintiff's perspective, adding a Monell claim to the case
may seem to offer a number of practical advantages:
1. Finding a deep pocket in typical police, jail, and employment
cases.
2. Avoiding the feared unwillingness of a jury to award large sums
against individual officers and employees.
3. Expanding the relevant evidence beyond the alleged misconduct
by the individual defendants to include wrongs committed by
other officers or employees.
4. Finding a suitable defendant where individual officers and employees will defend their own actions by saying they were following an explicit policy and could not have been expected to know
that the policy was unconstitutional.
5. Challenging a widespread practice to achieve deterrence.
6. Finding a viable damages remedy in cases where the constitutional standards are not sufficiently clear and the power to prevent the injury is not easy to locate, such as cases where the
problem stems from an inadequate budget or from a policymaker's failure to make a policy.
In my experience with civil rights cases, most Monell claims based on
alleged practices and customs appear to be motivated by the first
three grounds-a desire to add a defendant with a deeper pocket, a
concern about a jury's expected reluctance to award large damages
against an individual defendant, and/or a desire to broaden the scope
of relevant evidence. In the Seventh Circuit, at least, these motivations will only rarely justify any significant investment of time, money,
and energy in litigating the Monell claim. This is the result of several
important features of the legal landscape: indemnification, bifurcation
of trials, and issue preclusion.
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Indemnification

Indemnification laws and practices often make the search for a deep
pocket unnecessary. Indemnification of individual defendants is widespread. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, Indiana law gives local
governments discretionary authority to indemnify individual defendants for compensatory damages. 16 Illinois law goes further and
obliges local governments to indemnify individual defendants for
compensatory damages. 17 As the Seventh Circuit has explained, in
such instances the Moneil issue:
[H]as little, probably no, practical significance. No damages were
awarded against the City that were not also awarded on a joint and
several basis against the individual defendants; and since the City
indemnifies its employees for damage awards made against them in
respect of the torts they commit in the course of their employment,
[plaintiff] will
collect his judgment in full whether or not the City is
18
held liable.
Wisconsin goes even further and provides indemnification as a matter
of right for both compensatory and punitive damages.19
Even where indemnification is not required as a matter of law, as in
Indiana, there may be powerful reasons for the local government to
provide it. In any individual case, a commitment by the local government to indemnify the individual defendants certainly offers a way for
the defendants to maintain a united front against the plaintiff. Police
unions or other public employee unions have substantial political
clout that can persuade local governments to provide indemnity.
Also, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decisions refusing to inter16. IND. CODE § 34-4-16.7-1, repealed by Ind. Pub. L. No. 1-1998 (to be recodified at IND.
CODE § 34-13-4-1). Indiana Code § 34-4-16.7-1 leaves indemnification in Indiana up to the governor for the state and the "governing body of the political subdivision" to decide whether payment "is in the best interest of the governmental entity." This provision was repealed and
recodified by Indiana Public Law 1-1998, which substituted the new Ind. Code § 34-13-4-1 for
the old version. No substantive change was effected by the recodification of this provision as
part of the major recodification of the civil procedure code.
17. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/9-102 (West 1993); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 683
(7th Cir. 1997). The Illinois statute was amended in 1986 to limit its application to compensatory
damages after the Seventh Circuit held in Kolar v. County of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1985), that the earlier version of section 9-102 waived the county's immunity from punitive damage awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 567.
18. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988).
19. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 1997); see Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 379 & n.3
(7th Cir. 1998); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1271 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding city
defendant liable to pay punitive damages awarded against individual defendants); see also Board
of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 436 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting some
state indemnity statutes and arguing that such statutes may support reconsideration of the Monell ban on vicarious liability).
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pret § 1983 to authorize vicarious liability for the local government, 20
the practice of indemnification fits with a more practical recognition
that civil rights litigation based on acts committed within the scope of
employment is part of the cost of operating a local government.
In addition, the jury ordinarily will not be informed about indemnification.2 1 If there is a claim for punitive damages against individual
defendants in civil rights cases in Indiana, the court will instruct the
jury, upon request, that they may consider the individual defendant's
financial resources in deciding upon an amount of punitive damages.2 2
For alert jurors, such an instruction about punitive damages at least
suggests that the absence of a similar instruction about compensatory
damages means that compensatory damages will not be paid by the
individual defendants. Some jurors do figure this out, or correctly assume that the local government will pick up the tab of a plaintiff's
verdict.
B. Bifurcation of Trials
Courts have powerful reasons for bifurcating trials on claims against
individual defendants from trials on Monell claims against local government defendants. 23 Evidence of other wrongs needed to prove the
local government's policy or custom will often be unfairly prejudicial
to the individual defendant and will confuse and distract the jury from
the principal events in question. 24 These factors provide a district
court with substantial reasons to bifurcate the trial of the individual
20. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-95.
21. See Lawson, 153 F.3d at 379 (holding evidence of indemnification generally is not admissible, but after individual defendants offered evidence of their lack of assets and implied they
would be personally responsible for punitive damages, district court erred by refusing to allow
plaintiff to show that individual defendants would be indemnified under the Wisconsin statute).
22. Id.
23. See Sanchez v. City of Riverside, 596 F. Supp. 193, 194 (C.D. Cal. 1984); McIntosh v.
District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.96-0200-LFO, 1997 WL 785624, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Dec. 9,1997);
Keys v. City of Harvey, No. 92 C 2177, 1996 WL 34422, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1996); Myatt v.
City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259, 1263-64 (N.D. Il. 1992); Dawson v. Prince George's County,
896 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (D. Md. 1995); Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318,
319-20 (D. Md. 1991); Morales v. Irizarry, No. 95 CIV. 5068, 1996 WL 609416, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 22, 1996) (stating that the "overwhelming weight of authority" in Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York supports bifurcation); Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 796 F.
Supp. 84, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), afjd,
899 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding the district court's bifurcation of trial was proper and that the district court properly excluded policy and custom evidence from first trial as prejudicial to individual officers);
Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the district
court's bifurcation of trial on claims against individual officers from trial on Monell claims
against city and individual claim against police chief was proper).
24. Dawson, 896 F. Supp. at 540; Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251.
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and the policy claims. The trial of a Monell policy and custom claim
will require a great deal of evidence that is not relevant to the claim
against the individual defendants. 25 Trying the claims together produces longer trials, and juries face the difficult challenge of sorting out
the differences between the individual claims and the policy and custom claim. 26 Moreover, there is often a substantial risk that the additional evidence needed to prove the policy and custom claim will tend
to prejudice the individual defendants. 27 Although limiting instructions might be used as an alternative, they are not likely to be a satisfactory solution in most cases. Perhaps most important, very practical
pressures encourage bifurcation. The bifurcated trial is certain to be
shorter and to be more focused on what happened to the plaintiff.
The resulting trial should be easier for the jury to digest, and district
courts certainly have a preference for shorter rather than longer trials.
C. Issue Preclusion
The result of the first trial of claims against individual defendants is
likely to render moot the Monell claim against the local government
itself.28 After the claims against the individual defendant have been
tried, there is little to be gained in a typical case by actually conducting a separate trial on the Monell claim. If the verdict is for the
defense, there will not be a viable Moneil claim because the verdict
will amount to a finding of no constitutional violation. 29 If the verdict
is for the plaintiff and the local government agrees that the individual
defendant is entitled to indemnification for actual damages, neither
side nor the court is likely to have a significant reason to pursue the
Monell claim. The plaintiff's actual damages will have been determined by the first jury, and no punitive damages will be available at
that point. From the court's standpoint, at least so long as the local
government will indemnify the individual defendant, so that the plaintiff will be compensated regardless of the outcome of a trial on a Monell claim, I have a lot of other cases that need attention. Even if
there will be an appeal or other motions practice, the threat of a Monell claim trial may also be used to put pressure on a reluctant local
25. Ricciutti, 796 F. Supp. at 86.
26. Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251.
27. Myatt, 816 F. Supp. at 1264 & n.8; Dawson, 896 F. Supp. at 540.
28. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (reversing summarily the
circuit court decision holding plaintiff could proceed on Monell claim after jury returned defense
verdict on claim against individual officer that could not be explained on basis of qualified immunity); Sanchez, 596 F. Supp. at 195 & n.3 (dismissing Monell claims after city agreed to pay
judgment against individual defendant because no additional damages would be available).
29. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
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government to resolve the indemnification issue early and thereby to
avoid the Monell trial.
Thus, where the plaintiff's goal in bringing a Monell claim is to ensure that a deep pocket is available and/or to broaden the scope of
admissible evidence for the plaintiff, the factors discussed here will
render a Monell claim pointless from a practical standpoint, at least.
On the basis of anecdotal experience, but admittedly without quantitative support, I believe those features apply to a substantial majority
of cases alleging misconduct by police officers or other local government personnel.
Nevertheless, in describing this scenario, I have built in a number of
assumptions that mean there will be some important exceptions. One
exception is where there is a viable defense of qualified immunity that
requires a jury's resolution of disputed facts, such that the jury renders
a special verdict finding the plaintiff's rights were violated but also
finds facts establishing the defense of qualified immunity. 30 Another
exception is where indemnification is not available for some reason.
Under Indiana's indemnification law, for example, the local government (city police department, county sheriff, etc.) may have independently concluded that the individual defendant acted so improperly
31
that indemnification is either definitely or probably not available.
Police departments have taken that approach, for example, where the
individual officer-defendant faces or even has been convicted on criminal charges for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff. In other cases
involving, for example, off-duty conduct by a police officer, there may
be a dispute about the scope of employment that could prevent indemnification from being available.
The scenario of the bifurcated trial does not mean that a plaintiff
should not plead a Monell practice or custom claim where there are
sufficient grounds for it. With some local governments, the threat of a
Monell trial may still be needed to add a little pressure in favor of
indemnification. But if the general scenario I have described fits the
case, it will not make sense for anyone to spend much time and money
30. E.g., Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) ("When the issue of qualified
immunity remains unresolved at the time of trial,.... the district court may properly use special
interrogatories to allow the jury to determine disputed issues of fact upon which the court can
base its legal determination of qualified immunity."); Nessel v. City of Northlake, No. 93 C 6176,
1994 WL 685508, at *2 (N.D. Il. Dec. 5, 1994) (denying motion to bifurcate trial; if individual
defendants prevailed on qualified immunity defense, Monell claim would still need to be tried);
cf. Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that whether judge deciding qualified immunity must follow the jury's findings of fact in answer to special interrogatories is an
open question).
31. See supra note 16.
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litigating or deciding the Moneil issues. An early agreement or court
order to bifurcate the trial of individual liability and Monell claims
and to defer discovery and motions practice on the Moneil claim can
avoid a substantial waste of time and money. I suggest that such orders be available routinely in most cases combining claims against individual defendants and Moneil claims against local governments, at
least where the local government agrees (to the plaintiff's satisfaction)
that it will be responsible for a judgment against the individual
defendants.
Despite these limitations on their role, Monell custom and policy
claims retain an important role in protecting individual rights. That
role is narrower than simply finding a deep pocket or opening up
doors to a lot of prejudicial evidence. As I said at the outset, I hoped
to learn from the Symposium, and I did. Flint Taylor spoke persuasively about cases of truly systemic government wrongdoing in which
Monell claims can be used to expose government tolerance of official
wrongdoing. 32 There may be a few cases in which government wrongdoing appears so systemic and widespread that a Moneil trial would, if
plaintiffs prevail, have significant deterrent value-significantly
greater than successful litigation of individual claims. Such cases will
be rare, I think (and hope), especially if a plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel already have assurances of payment of at least compensatory damages and fees. At the same time, these may be some of the most
important cases. Where a plaintiff and her knowledgeable lawyers are
prepared to invest substantial time and money in such an effort, the
court may want to consider whether the particular case is one of these
rare cases that warrant the greater efforts necessary to litigate and
33
resolve the Monel issues.
Also, the original role of Monell claims remains, of course: cases
challenging explicit government policies that violate federal rights.
32. G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator'sView of Discovery and Proofin Police Misconduct Policy and
Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747 (1999).

33. At least one court has held that where the local government had agreed to pay the judgment against the individual officer, the Monell claim presented no further case or controversy.
Sanchez v. City of Riverside, 596 F. Supp. 193, 195 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the Monell claim was independently significant). More recently, however, the Ninth
Circuit has questioned that conclusion and indicated that the need to try a Monell claim may be
more a question of court priorities. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640 & n.4
(9th Cir. 1991) (affirming judgment of nominal damages against city in second phase of bifurcated proceeding after compensatory damages were awarded against individual defendants, and
distinguishing and questioning Sanchez on this point). Even under the approach taken in
Sanchez, though, there would be a case or controversy on the Monell claim unless and until the
claim against the individual defendant was actually paid, so that the plaintiff had no further
possible need for the Monell claim.
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These cases are far less common, however, than attempts to add "custom or practice" claims to claims against individual government
employees.
Monell policy and customs may have one other role, but one in
which causation can be difficult to establish. These would be claims in
which the plaintiff's injuries are fairly traceable to a local government's budgeting decisions. One example I have dealt with involved
jail safety policies and devices. In Stovall v. McAtee, 34 the plaintiff had

been arrested one night for public intoxication and put in the lock-up
in a local jail. The plaintiff alleged that other detainees beat him up
that night.35 These days such incidents and claims are all too common
in jails. Plaintiffs have a difficult time proving such claims. The most

straightforward cases for plaintiffs are those in which the plaintiff can
identify particular prison or jail personnel who had actual knowledge
of a specific threat to harm the plaintiff. 36 In the absence of a threat
specific to the injured detainee or prisoner, the legal standards (at
least in the Seventh Circuit) appear to be so indefinite that individual
37
liability would be foreclosed by qualified immunity.
In the face of a pattern of inmate-on-inmate abuse, a decision not to
fund reasonable protective measures (such as staffing sufficient to
make frequent rounds, surveillance cameras, staffing to monitor surveillance cameras, distress alarms, segregated facilities for intoxicated
detainees who are vulnerable to assaults by other inmates) can be
34. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
35. Id. at 1126.
36. See, e.g., Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment for plaintiff where prison officials knew that cellmate posed imminent danger); Santiago v. Lane, 894
F.2d 218, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1990); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1988); cf. Walsh
v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that notice of a specific threat is not
necessary if inmate is a member of identifiable group for whom risk of assault is substantial).
37. See Walsh v. Brewer, 733 F.2d 473, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that threat of harm may
be actionable under the Eighth Amendment even in the absence of actual assault if conditions in
prison amount to "reign of terror"); see also Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1997)
(using "reign of terror" language); James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1992)
(providing a collection of cases demonstrating that a plaintiff can show existence of so substantial a risk of harm that defendants' knowledge of the risk can be inferred); Estate of Davis v.
Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that to demonstrate callous indifference to
inmate safety, a plaintiff must show a "strong likelihood" of violence, not just a random act of
violence); cf. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding a genuine
issue of fact as to whether the sheriff and county were deliberately indifferent to the "substantial
risk of serious harm" faced by detainees in county jail lock-up where evidence showed that
inmate-on-inmate violence occurred "regularly" when the jail was overcrowded; sheriff and
county failed to take measures that could reduce risk; sheriff's efforts to obtain funding to build a
new jail would be relevant to sheriffs individual liability, but would not necessarily relieve him
or the county from liability), overruled in part by, Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285,
1289-90 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that Alabama sheriffs act as state officials, not
county officials, in the daily management of county jails).
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treated as a policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the
safety of inmates. In those circumstances, the most appropriate remedy may be against the governmental entity that budgeted inadequately. A sheriff sued in an individual capacity may argue, with
ample justification, that he or she made reasonable efforts to obtain
additional funding from the local legislative or fiscal body, but that the
legislators refused to provide the funding. Individual local legislators
are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for claims under § 1983
based on their legislative activities, including their budgeting
38
decisions.
A recent Seventh Circuit decision on a related matter of county jail
administration, Armstrong v. Squadrito,39 illustrates the need for and
value of Monell claims where individual responsibility may be difficult
to ascertain. Plaintiff Armstrong "voluntarily turned himself in" to
the County Sheriff for failing to appear at a contempt hearing for
overdue child support payments.40 The state statute authorizing the
arrest directed the sheriff executing the warrant to take the person
"immediately" before the court that issued the writ.41 According to
standard operating procedure, the jail officials notified court officials
of the arrest and put Armstrong on a list of "will call" detainees. 42 Jail
policy was that jail officials would wait for the court to notify them of
the "will call" detainee's court date and would take no further action
to ensure a prompt hearing or timely release. 43 In Armstrong's case,
however, someone had inverted two digits in the case number in the
records sent to the court. 44 As a result, the state court never called for
Armstrong. 45 Also, according to Armstrong, jail officials kept telling
him to be patient and refused to accept his complaint forms asking
about his court appearance date. 46 After Armstrong's employer hired
a lawyer for him because he needed Armstrong at work, Armstrong
was released after fifty-seven days in custody awaiting an "immediate"
hearing. 47
Among several constitutional claims in Armstrong's § 1983 case was
a claim under Monell asserting that the jail's "will call" policy
38. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
39. 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 567.
41. See IND. CODE § 34-4-9-2.1(c) & (d) (1997), amended and recodified in IND. CODE 34-47
by Ind. Pub. L. 1-1998.
42. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 567-68.
43. Id. at 568.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 568-69.
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amounted to deliberate indifference to detainees' rights because there
was a conscious decision not to put in place a procedure to protect
against errors that would delay appearances and releases. 48 The jail
officials argued the policy was saved by their complaint policy because
a detainee could obtain relief from his continued detention by filing a
complaint with jail officials. 49 The Seventh Circuit agreed that such a
policy could save the "will call" policy from being deliberately indifferent to the risk of unlawful and prolonged detention, but that Armstrong also presented facts tending to show that the jail's actual
practice and policy was to refuse to accept complaints requesting information about a "will call" detainee's status. 50 The Seventh Circuit
reinstated the Moneil claim as well as claims against individual
5
defendants. '
Armstrong provides an important illustration of the value of Monell
policy and custom claims in situations where there is room for individual defendants to argue about just who is responsible for a deprivation
of the plaintiff's rights.

III.

THE STATE GOVERNMENT/LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY

A 1997 Supreme Court decision has given new life to an issue that
has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff's rights were violated.
The issue is whether certain governmental units should be treated as
arms of state government or as local governments for purposes of
Monell claims. The issue arises because of the dichotomy between
Monell and Will v. Michigan Department of State Police.52 There are
lots of easy cases, of course, but the Supreme Court's decision in
McMillian v. Monroe County53 opens up new opportunities for litigating that boundary line office-by-office, state-by-state, and function-byfunction.
The plaintiff in the case, Walter McMillian, had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. 54 After spending six years on death
row, the Alabama state courts reversed his conviction because the
state had suppressed exculpatory evidence, including prior statements
55
by the state's chief witness that contradicted his trial testimony.
McMillian then sued the county sheriff and investigators for the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577-78.
Id. at 578-79.
Id.
Id. at 580-82.
491 U.S. 58 (1989).

53. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
54. Id. at 783.
55. Id.
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county and the state.5 6 He alleged that the sheriff and the county investigator had intimidated the state's chief witness into making false
statements and had suppressed that witness's exculpatory statements.5 7 The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether the
sheriff, who had been sued in his official capacity, was a policy-maker
for the county or for the state.5 8 The Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, held that when an Alabama sheriff investigates crimes and
assists in criminal prosecutions, the sheriff acts as a policy-maker for
59
the State of Alabama and not for the county where he or she serves.
As a result, McMillian could not sue either the county or the State of
60
Alabama for damages for his six years on death row.
Because the holding in McMillian was so narrow, limited to Alabama sheriffs acting in a particular capacity, 6 1 the case is more important for its methodology than for its actual holding, at least outside
Alabama. The problem is that the methodology is not enlightening.
The majority explained at the outset of the opinion that whether the
sheriff acted as a state or county official would not be decided "in
some categorical, 'all or nothing' manner," but would depend on the
official's function at issue in the particular case, and on the official's
status under state law. 62 As a result, McMillian invites litigation of
this issue office-by-office, function-by-function, and state-by-state.
Moreover, the majority's approach in McMillian offers little guidance
as to how to balance conflicting indications in state law. The majority
supported its conclusion with a state constitutional provision designating the "sheriff[s] [of] each county" as members of the state's executive department, 63 another constitutional provision giving the state
supreme court the authority to remove a sheriff from office, 64 state
case law holding that sheriffs are state officers so that tort claims
against sheriffs for their official acts are suits against the state rather
than the county, 65 and with statutory provisions making sheriffs responsible for carrying out orders of state courts and for enforcing the
state's criminal law in their respective counties. 66 The majority found
unpersuasive the facts that the county pays the sheriff's salary and
56. Id. at 783-84.
57. Id. at 784.

58. Id. at 785-86.
59. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793.

60. Id. at 783-84.
61. Id. at 785-86.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 785.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788.
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 789.
Id. at 789-90.
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provides the sheriff with equipment, supplies, and personnel, and that
each sheriff is elected by voters in one county and has a jurisdiction
67
limited to that county.

The combination of the narrow holding and lack of clear guidance
in balancing competing factors (highlighted by the five to four decision in the Supreme Court) 68 invites a great deal of new litigation.
McMillian creates new uncertainty for litigation against, among other
entities, school corporations, sheriffs, prosecutors, and court clerks.
Even where circuit law was well-established before McMillian, it is
now open to reconsideration. For example, before McMillian, the
Seventh Circuit had held that Illinois sheriffs are county officials and
therefore are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 69 In

the wake of McMillian, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Illinois sheriffs from Alabama sheriffs and reaffirmed its view that Illinois sheriffs
act as county officers when they perform their primary law enforce70

ment duties.
Last year, I dealt with the role of prosecutors under Indiana law.

They clearly act as state officials when prosecuting, but under McMillan there was more room for argument about their role when hiring
71
and firing employees.

67. Id. at 791-92; cf. id. at 796-804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing the balance of these
factors tips toward treating the sheriff as a county official).
68. Id. at 781.
69. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 488 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a detective with an
Illinois sheriff's department was a county officer, not state officer); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d
525 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding an Illinois sheriff acted as a county officer when designing and implementing a computer system that tracked state court arrest warrants); cf. Scott v. O'Grady, 975
F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting an Illinois sheriff acted as a state officer when executing a
state court's writ to evict occupants of a building).
70. Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 684-86 (7th Cir. 1998).
71. See Bibbs v. Newman, 997 F. Supp. 1174, 1180-81 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding prosecutor
acted as state official when hiring and firing deputy prosecutor). Other circuits have drawn
similar distinctions based on state law in deciding whether prosecutors were subject to suit under
§ 1983 or were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kaye, 87
F.3d 1491, 1499-1506 (3d Cir. 1996) (deciding for § 1983 purposes, New Jersey county prosecutor
made policy for county when refusing to promote investigator); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New
York, 996 F.2d 522, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding a New York county district attorney is a state
policy-maker when deciding when or whom to prosecute, but is a municipal policy-maker under
§ 1983 on administrative matters such as office policy and training of employees); Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1206-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating a plaintiff might be able to prove for
§ 1983 purposes that an Arizona county attorney, a position described in the state constitution as
an "office of the county," was a county policy-maker when holding "roundup" of bad check
offenders); Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding a Texas district attorney
is a county policy-maker and not protected by the Eleventh Amendment in case alleging county
policy of issuing misdemeanor capias without judicial finding of probable cause).
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In Indiana, we have a similar question concerning clerks of the state
courts in each county. 72 The same issue has also arisen concerning
school corporations in Indiana. 73
Another good illustration of the effects of McMillian is the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Turquitt v. Jefferson County.74 A jail

inmate fatally stabbed a pre-trial detainee in an Alabama county jail. 75
The victim's estate sued, alleging "that the jail was severely overcrowded and that, because the jail lacked a classification system, inmates were housed together without regard for their relative dangerousness or conviction status. ' 76 The complaint also alleged that the
individual defendants (the sheriff and several deputies) knew of the
killer's dangerousness but "took no action to control him," and that
they "did not exercise adequate supervision" over jail inmates and
"failed to properly train and supervise" jail staff.77 The victim's estate
also sued the county, which moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
sheriff was not a policymaker for the county when he operated the
jail. 78
The Eleventh Circuit applied McMillian, which had also dealt with
Alabama sheriffs, and held in Turquitt that an Alabama sheriff is also
a state policymaker, and not a county policymaker, when "operating a
county jail."' 79 The Eleventh Circuit explained that Alabama law dele-

gates to sheriffs the responsibility to supervise inmates in jails and
gives state officials, not county officials, the authority to supervise the
sheriffs.8 0 Alabama law also gives sheriffs the authority to hire, fire,
and supervise jail personnel, and a state agency has some oversight
authority over county jails. 81 Under Alabama law, however, a county
72. Compare Parsons v. Bourff, 739 F. Supp. 1266, 1267 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding a clerk is a
state official and not subject to § 1983 suit in his official capacity) with Winters v. Mowery, 884 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (overruling another prior decision and holding a clerk of a judicial
circuit in Marion County is not a state official where county would pay any judgment against the
clerk).
73. See Board of Trustees v. Landry, 622 N.E.2d 1019, 1024-25 (Ind. App. 1993) (holding
school corporation was arm of state for purposes of § 1983), rev'd on reh'g, 638 N.E.2d 1261,
1265-66 (Ind. App. 1994) (holding school corporation is a political subdivision that could be sued
under § 1983).
74. 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
75. Id. at 1286.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1287.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1288.
80. Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288-89. The court pointed out that the state had taken over supervision of sheriffs through a 1901 constitutional amendment designed in part to protect the rights of
prisoners because of concern that county courts were failing to punish sheriffs who had allowed
lynch mobs to murder prisoners. Id.
81. Id. at 1289.
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is responsible for funding the operation of the jail and for erecting and
maintaining the jail, which means providing a facility of "sufficient
size and strength to secure the prisoners. ' 82 In response to the plaintiff's argument that the county and the sheriff are "partners" in operating county jails, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Alabama case law
holding that the sheriff's authority over jail operations is "totally independent" of the county government. 83 The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, concluded that the county84was not responsible for alleged wrongs
in the "operation" of the jail.
I have no reason or basis for arguing with the unanimous Eleventh
Circuit about this particular application of McMillian or the intricacies
of Alabama law. But I believe the case highlights a problem in the
McMillian analysis. The problem is that the "functional" approach
under McMillian seems to make the case turn on the fluid concept of
jail "operations." If we assume for purposes of argument that the allegations in the complaint were true, that the victim had been a pre-trial
detainee in a severely overcrowded county jail, the county was responsible under Alabama law for providing the jail building and maintaining it, and for appropriating funds to operate it. The sheriff was
responsible for actually operating it. It is not difficult to imagine the
individual defendants' likely response to claims that they failed to
"operate" the jail properly: we did the best we could to manage too
many inmates in a jail that was too small and with insufficient staffing,
security monitoring devices, and alarms. If the county gave us more
money, we could do a better job. Assuming further that there is a
sound factual basis for that defense, what does it mean to say that the
sheriff rather than the county is responsible for "operating" the jail?
From the detainee-victim's viewpoint, the difference between an injury caused by the combination of inadequate facilities, inadequate
funding and staffing, and the failure of overworked guards to pay sufficient attention to the dangers posed by a particular inmate may not
seem very important.
In the short term, McMillian gives defendants a wild card they can
play to try to block a damages claim for reasons having nothing to do
with the merit or lack of merit of the underlying claim. I use the term
"wild card" because the majority offers so little guidance for applying
its approach to other offices, other states, and other functions of particular officials. The practical consequences of McMillian in the coming years will be a lot of time spent and ink spilled in resolving these
82. Id. at 1289-90.
83. Id. at 1290 (citing King v. Colbert County, 620 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993)).
84. Id. at 1291-92.
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issues. I offer this line of litigation as additional evidence that the
system of civil rights doctrines and remedies makes little sense and
deserves to be revisited.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown,85 offers a glimmer of hope, and should not be overlooked. In
Brown, a jury had found a county liable for injuries inflicted by a deputy sheriff when he arrested the plaintiff. 86 The county's liability was
based on the sheriff's decision to hire the deputy (a son of the sheriff's
nephew) without adequately reviewing the deputy's background,
which included a number of arrests and misdemeanor convictions for
driving offenses, assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public
drunkenness. 87 The Supreme Court majority of five justices held that
the county could not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.8 8 The
majority explained that where a claim of municipal liability rests on a
single decision, such as a hiring decision, that does not itself violate
federal law or direct someone else to violate federal law, "the danger
that a municipality will be held liable without fault is high."' 89 The
majority, therefore, held:
A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Only where
adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the
deprivation of a third party's federally protected right can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize
'90 the applicant's background
constitute "deliberate indifference. "
The Supreme Court remanded the case to apply the newly-articulated
standard. 91
There is room, of course, for a reasonable argument that where a
sheriff decides to hire a deputy with a significant record of assault and
battery, resisting arrest, public intoxication, and drunk driving, the
risk that the deputy will use excessive force against suspects is at least
substantial, if perhaps not "plainly obvious." Justice Souter made this
point for three dissenters. 92
85. 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 402.
87. Id. at 401.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Brown, 520 U.S. at 416.
Id. at 425-27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In a separate dissenting opinion with broader implications, however, Justice Breyer argued that it is time to rethink Monell.93 Going
beyond the issues in Brown itself, Justice Breyer reviewed the "highly
complex body of interpretive law" that has followed Monell.94 He acknowledged the majority's concern that a decision in favor of the
plaintiff in Brown itself might tend to undermine Monell's line between individual and governmental liability. 95 He argued, however,
that the majority's concern, "rather than leading us to spin ever finer
distinctions as we try to apply Monell's basic distinction between liability that rests upon policy and liability that is vicarious, suggests that
we should reexamine the legal soundness of that basic distinction itself."' 96 Justice Breyer stopped short of expressing a willingness to
overrule Monell, but he laid out a persuasive argument for reconsidering the question of municipal liability based on the weak underpinnings of the Monell holding, the complex and inconsistent body of law
that has developed after Monell, and the widespread availability of
indemnification for individual defendants. 97 He concluded by urging
the Court to ask for further argument on the continued viability of the
and
Monell distinction between vicarious liability, which is prohibited,
98
permitted.
is
which
custom,
and
policy
upon
based
liability
As I have said, my vantage point here is not the lofty perch of the
academy or the Supreme Court. From my vantage point, however, I
can say that I hope the Court will eventually take up Justice Breyer's
invitation to reconsider the central holding of Moneil. Unless and until it does, however, lower courts and litigants will continue to struggle
with these difficult issues that have little to do with whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated.
IV.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUES FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL IN

MONELL CASES

Finally, I would like to address a problem that arises in cases combining Monell claims and claims against individual officers or employees. In these cases the local government and the individual
defendants often use the same defense lawyer, selected and paid for
by the local government. Especially if indemnification clearly will be
available to the individual defendants, this approach enables the de93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 430-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 430-31.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 431-36.
Id. at 437.
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fendants to maintain a solid defensive front. There is, however, some
potential for conflicts of interest to develop, especially to the potential
detriment of individual defendants who rely on counsel provided by
the local government. The local government may have at least a
short-term interest in seeing that if the plaintiff wins a verdict, it is a
verdict against the individual employees or officers who have acted
improperly, and for which the local government may be able to avoid
indemnifying the individual defendants. In Indiana, for example, a
local government may decide not to indemnify individual defendants
for punitive damage awards. A plaintiff who wins a verdict with minimal compensatory damages and a sizable punitive damage award in
my court has won a pyrrhic victory. In addition, there may be political
or public relations reasons for a local government to prefer a verdict
that any wrongdoing was the act of maverick employees or officers
rather than a result of policy decisions of senior officials.
Because of these potential conflicts of interests among defendants
represented by the same lawyer, courts have an obligation to be alert
to the possibility of an actual conflict. 99 Nevertheless, courts have
every reason to be skeptical when the plaintiff argues that defense
counsel faces a potential or actual conflict of interest among his or her
defendants/clients. Such efforts by plaintiffs are ordinarily attempts to
drive a wedge between defendants to encourage individual defendants
to turn against their employer or to gain a tactical advantage by raising the cost of litigation for the opponents.
Unfortunately, however, the Second Circuit's decision in Dunton
gives plaintiffs a powerful reason to raise the conflict issue. In Dunton, the Second Circuit found that defense counsel faced an actual
conflict that prevented the individual defendant from receiving a fair
trial on the claim against him.100 To what we may presume was the
astonishment and dismay of the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit concluded that the remedy for having one defendant and its counsel treat
another defendant unfairly was to reverse the plaintiffs verdict and remand for a new trial. 10 1 Based on this precedent, a plaintiff who
smells a potential favorable verdict has every reason to seek a clean
102
record on the issue of the joint representation for defendants.
99. See Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1146-48 (7th Cir. 1987); Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984); Clay v.
Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
100. Dunton, 729 F.2d at 909-10.
101. Id. at 911.
102. See Clay, 608 F. Supp. at 304 (recognizing Dunton "gave a plaintiff a vital stake in such a
motion by reversing his favorable judgment there and forcing a new trial," but not endorsing
Dunton remedy).
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From my perspective, however, and as Judge Shadur suggested in
Clay,'0 3 vacating a plaintiff's verdict is not the correct remedy for such
problems. This is a matter of simple fairness to a plaintiff. In addition, the Dunton rule appears to be unique in civil litigation. We all
accept the idea that a criminal defendant who has been sent to prison
as a result of his lawyer's ineffectiveness is entitled under the Sixth
Amendment to a new trial, although that remedy is understandably
available only if a stringent standard can be satisfied. 10 4 But I do not
believe there are any other areas of civil law in which the courts conclude that the remedy for a poor performance or a conflict of interest
on the part of a lawyer for a civil litigant is to grant a new trial in
which that lawyer's client gets a second chance to win the case. One
might ask, for example, whether the courts would be willing to give a
civil rights plaintiff the benefit of a similar remedy if the plaintiff's
lawyer has faced an actual conflict of interest. I am aware of no deciexsion recognizing such a remedy, which inflicts additional risk and
10 5 If
trial.
a
at
prevailed
already
have
who
defendants
on
pense
vacating a plaintiff's verdict is an available remedy where there is a
conflict of interest among defendants and their joint counsel, moreover, the natural result will be to encourage unnecessary litigation of
these conflict of interest issues. Where the professional ethics of defense counsel are not sufficient to avoid the problem, the prospect of
malpractice liability should be sufficient. And if there is still a problem that surfaces after a trial (or so close to trial that a continuance to
find new defense lawyer would substantially prejudice the plaintiff),
the remedy ought to be against the defense lawyer and/or the local
government that employed the lawyer, not against the plaintiff who
has won a judgment.

103. Id. at 304-05.
104. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
105. Cf. Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The delay has cost his client
the litigation and exposes [the lawyer] to a suit for malpractice."); Coleman, 814 F.2d at 1147
(declining to decide, where defendants were not diligent in protecting their interests, whether a
diligent defendant might be entitled to relief from default judgment entered based on lawyer's
repeated violation of discovery orders).
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